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The attitude to ethnic minorities in Tsarist Russia was quite tolerant, by and large, with the exception of several ethnic groups. This can be seen in the first State Duma elections, when members of the public were asked - for the first time in Russian history - what kind of future they wanted. Interestingly, regional parties demanding secession from Russia, in the Baltic and the Caucasus for example, lost. The winning parties championed cultural independence, education and court sessions in their own languages, while remaining within the Russian empire. Poland was probably the only province to continue pushing for sovereignty. But even there, the parties that won the broadest support were only moderately separatist, in stark contrast to the underground revolutionary movements. Thus - the politicians were more interested in winning full independence than the general public.
What kind of ethnic policy should be regarded as competent and able to avert disintegration? Rossiiskaya Gazeta Discussion Club moderator Yevgeny Shestakov tries to establish that in this interview with Prof. Andrei Zubov.
Andrei Zubov holds a doctorate in history, and is a member of the faculty of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations’ Philosophy Department.
Yevgeny Shestakov: Would you agree with the thesis that the emergence of new states and the collapse of old ones is a phenomenon bourne of incompetent ethnic policies?
Andrei Zubov: That is partly true, I think. Incompetent ethnic policies are quite a common phenomenon in history, particularly in that of the last century. It is safe to say that were it not for these incompetant policies, there would be fewer mono-ethnic states and more multi-ethnic ones now. On the other hand, though, the period from the 19th to the 20th centuries was an age of nationalism: when the idea of a national state replaced that of a state based on a shared religion, as the dominant idea across Europe. This idea generated a striving for sovereignty even in minorities that had little to complain about - such as the Czechs and Hungarians in the Austrian Empire. They came to believe they’d be better off independent. As a rule, this belief proves illusory, yet it often leads to the emergence of new states.
Shestakov: Is the emergence of new states a uniquely 20th century phenomenon?
Zubov: It would be wrong to say that this phenomenon is a feature of the 20th and 21st centuries. It should suffice to recall the Jewish people’s struggle under the Seleucid Empire, back in the 3rd-2nd centuries BC, for an independent religious state, or the Battle of Kulikovo. Such aspirations were not uncommon throughout history. But it was only in the 19th and 20th centuries that the struggle for a national state assumed so massive proportions. This arose first of all from the fact that, as I said earlier, that period saw an unprecedented departure from religion as the principal unifying belief. For instance, the Austrian Empire was predominantly Roman Catholic. And as long as that idea of a Catholic state prevailed, nationalist sentiment was insignificant. This is not to say that there was none at all: it was marginal. German and Latin, which was used in Catholic liturgy, were the two common languages. However, when religion began ceding ground in the 18th-19th centuries, secularism came to the fore.
Shestakov: Does that mean that religion should be seen as the main unifying factor capable of averting a state’s collapse?
Zubov: Religion cannot avert a collapse, but it does lead to the formation of countries along different lines and within different borders.
A Lutheran community of states, a Roman Catholic community and a Christian Orthodox community all emerged in Europe after 1517. Many European states were multi-ethnic, but mono-denominational. In the 17th and 18th centuries the multidenominational state was seen as being a divisive model.
Remember that the main wars that engulfed Europe in the 17th and early 18th centuries were religious: between Protestants and Catholics or between Catholics and Orthodox Christians. These were not wars about imposing one’s faith on others, but rather about upholding the principle of a common religion for the sovereign and the nation. The subjects had to share their monarch’s faith. And since there were many more ethnicities in Europe than denominations, the transition from the religious model to secularism led to the emergence of many new states.
If we look at a map of early 20th century Europe, we can see large states, such as the German Empire, the Austrian Empire, the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. A post-WWI map shows each of these empires broke up into several smaller states. And this process of ethnic fragmentation continues to this day. Almost every ethnic group that took shape as a political nation in the 19th-20th centuries has now acquired statehood.
Shestakov: In retrospect, did all large empires fall as a result of war, or are there cases of peaceful disintegration?
Zubov: Of course, there were cases where new states emerged through peaceful agreements, especially in recent history. But as a rule, war was the trigger. War can serve as a catalyst for the emergence of ideas of secession. In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, for instance, discussions had long been underway about transforming the dual monarchy, comprising two ethnic states (Germanic and Hungarian), into a triple monarchy incorporating a Slavic state. There was a lot of talk, but no action. Then happened the First World War, and Austria-Hungary’s defeat in it led to the emergence of a whole number of Slavic states as well as the separation of Austria and Hungary.
Similar processes were underway in Russia. The restoration of Poland’s independence was discussed at length, but the Russian government ruled this option out as unacceptable. It became less categorical during WWI, when Poland found itself under German occupation. In 1917, the Tsarist government decided to grant full sovereignty to the Poles. And it was in March 1917 that one of the first acts of the Provisional Government declared the restoration of Poland’s independence. So you see, warfare always acts as a catalyst for that process of separation.
Shestakov: You’ve only mentioned wars against external enemies: wars waged between empires that led to a geopolitical reconfiguration of the world. But what about civil wars?
Zubov: Civil wars are rarely efficient in this respect, for the simple reason that most large states have the capacity to maintain control over their territory. Although if we recall major colonial empires (Britain, France and Portugal), each broke up as a result of conflict in a territory that was once a single state. Some of those conflicts were violent and even ferocious (as was the case with many of Portugal’s colonies), others quite low-key.
India, by contrast, didn’t go to war to regain its independence from Britain. There was a classic peaceful liberation movement, led by Gandhi, which worked step-by-step toward the creation of an independent Indian state. But there was bloodshed even here. The subcontinent saw the emergence of two states: India, with a predominantly Hindu population, and Pakistan, populated by Muslims. One could well have expected their further fragmentation, because India is home to many large ethnic groups all with long histories. The emergence of an independent Bengali state or a sovereign Tamil Nadu seemed likely. But those possibilities did not materialize. Some separatist movements were active, but they all proved weak and inefficient. Both India and Pakistan have each to this day remained multi-ethnic states, each held together along religious lines.
Indonesia, too, is a multiethnic state built around Islam.
Shestakov: Some experts argue that all centralization, especially where it is heavy-handed, will inevitably end in a state’s disintegration. To what extent do you share this view?
Zubov: Of course, ethnic policies always demand broad autonomy for those peoples that make up the state. But there are two types of autonomy. One is territorial, which cannot be reserved for any particular ethnicity, since delineation strictly along ethnic lines is rarely possible.
Ethnicity is one factor that went into India’s administrative division, but no one state is mono-ethnic and areas populated by the same ethnic group are often divided between two or more states.
On the other hand, there’s the principle of cultural autonomy, in which the administrative division of a multi-ethnic state is carried out in total disregard for ethnicity. When this model is applied, people are free to identify themselves as whatever ethnicity they like and elect their respective ethnic councils through a simple democratic procedure. Such councils can be elected anywhere in the country, not specifically in a constituency where this particular ethnicity is predominant. They exist to resolve their voters’ social problems, notably those related to education, the media and national culture. Council members are represented in the national parliament. Austria-Hungary went down this road. The former Czechoslovakia and Estonia also opted for this model. I think it’s quite efficient, especially in the territorially mixed environment of a multi-ethnic state.
Shestakov: Looking back through Russian history, when would you say ethnic policy could be called a success, and when did it fail, triggering unrest and revolution?
Zubov: That’s a tricky one. Any system of relations, ethnic or otherwise, is based on the "action-reaction” principle. At the outset of the 19th century, ethnic challenges weren’t formidable, and very few peoples in the Russian Empire were conscious of their ethnic identity.
However, in 19th century Russia, ethnic groups with a literary tradition were normally guaranteed education in their native languages. The principle of religious tolerance was also maintained. In some respects, non-Russian and non-Orthodox communities were in a more advantageous position than the rest of the population. For instance, neither Jews nor Muslims were subject to serfdom. They remained free while a significant proportion of the Orthodox Christian population were serfs.
Finland, for one, never rebelled against the Russian state. It retained all its rights, its own parliament, its monetary system, its language and culture. Incidentally, Finland was the only part of the Russian Empire to offer its citizens universal public education in the late 19th century.
The attitude to ethnic minorities in Tsarist Russia was quite tolerant, by and large, with the exception of several ethnic groups. This can be seen in the first State Duma elections, when members of the public were asked - for the first time in Russian history - what kind of future they wanted. Interestingly, regional parties demanding secession from Russia, in the Baltic and the Caucasus for example, lost. The winning parties championed cultural independence, education and court sessions in their own languages, while remaining within the Russian empire. Poland was probably the only province to continue pushing for sovereignty. But even there, the parties that won the broadest support were only moderately separatist, in stark contrast to the underground revolutionary movements. Thus - the politicians were more interested in winning full independence than the general public.
Shestakov: Would it be fair to talk about the existence of a certain set of rules that could guarantee any state against its disintegration?
Zubov: Definitely, there’s a whole range of political tools countries can use to ward off disintegration, and there are quite a few good books on the topic. One approach involves building a particular kind of relations between the various ethnic communities, both the elites and the general public. Another involves respecting the traditional lifestyle and worldview of each constituent ethnic group, as well as its history.
Why would it be wrong to compare Russia to the United States, for example? Because most U.S. residents are immigrants and many of the country’s ethnic communities are not native to that land. In Russia, by contrast, ethnic peoples most often inhabit their ancestral territories, where they have lived since time immemorial. Most of the country’s Tatar population is concentrated in Tatarstan and the majority of Chechens live in their native Chechnya. The Russian Empire was also home to Georgians and Armenians.
If these and other ethnic groups’ right to preserve their identity in their ancestral homeland, Russia, is not respected, and they are denied the possibility of educating their children in their mother tongue, the consequences could be dire.
Shestakov: The other side of this coin is a potential clash between different ethnic and religious mindsets…
Zubov: The "different mindset” discourse is 90% based on a myth created by politicians. Whatever our cultural or ethnic "mentality”, we all value the same things in life because we’re all human. We all want to live in peace and prosperity, to have the right and ability to speak our native language and for our children to be educated in the language we choose. There’s no fundamental difference between a Russian and, say, a Chechen. It’s just that the Russians are more numerous and there are fewer Chechens. But that doesn not matter. All ethnicities are equally valuable regardless of their numerical strength. There’s no ethnicity that would voluntarily forego their right to think and speak their native language, is there?
Different ethnic groups can live together, side by side, in one country provided the rights of each are respected. There are quite a few examples to illustrate this point, and India is, perhaps, the best one.
Shestakov: What’s so interesting about India’s experience, do you think?
Zubov: The most interesting thing is that a lot of different ethnicities and races co-exist there within one country. They are not all of one cultural level. Some can trace the history of their national identity back several thousand years while others essentially continue to exist along tribal lines and have not established any coherent national identity as such. Yet, all these groups live together in today’s India. In this predominantly Hindu nation, Muslims account for 8 to 10% of the population. There are quite a few Christians there, as well. Yet, the country is not falling apart. I think India’s experience could prove really useful for Russia.
The most negative event in modern Russian history was the Bolshevik revolution and the subsequent establishment of the Soviet Union, because it was organized along the principle of territorial rather than cultural autonomy. And in addition there was the philosophy that the lead ethnic group should enjoy greater rights than all the other constituents. This model was reinforced by the iron fist of Communist dictatorship. But as soon as the party collapsed, the nation fell apart.
The Soviet empire was based not on the principle of consensus between its constituent member states, but on the principle of their strict subordination to the party. Built as a totalitarian system, it failed to withstand the test of democracy. It came tumbling down as soon as the Soviet totalitarian regime ceased to exist.
Shestakov: How fair would it be to say that Russia is an Orthodox country and that Orthodox Christianity could unify the nation?
Zubov: Today’s Russia may be described as an Orthodox state in the sense that four-fifths of the population identify themselves as historical Christians, according to polls. On the other hand, Russia’s religious life isn’t nearly as vibrant as that of India, for example. Modern-day Indians tend to be very pious while most Russians are quite indifferent. For them, unlike in India, faith is a minor factor. Therefore, unlike in India, in Russia, ethnic identity is the most important factor.
Shestakov: Could you explain what you mean by that?
Zubov: I mean that people identify themselves first and foremost as members of a particular ethnic group, rather than of a particular religious denomination. There is strong nationalist sentiment in Ukraine. Surveys say very few Ukrainians would back reintegration with Russia. But they are Orthodox Christians, like us. So the divisive factor here is ethnic origin, or national identity, not faith.
Here’s one more example. The Tatars and many peoples across the North Caucasus, such as the Chechens and the Ingush, are Sunni Muslims. But they do not share a single ethnic identity. The Volga region Tartars don’t feel they have much in common with those who share their faith in the Caucasus.
Perhaps, the best unifying idea that all the people’s of Russia could rally around would be that of a multiethnic and multidenominational state, guaranteeing equal rights, including ethnic and religious rights, for all its citizens while also providing universal rights to security and welfare. If these rights are exercised in reality, then this habitual co-existance common among almost all ethnic groups in today’s Russia would hold the nation together for ever.
Conversley, discrimination against any individual constituent group would inevitably undermine unity in the country.